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During the 1970s, the Netherlands introduced a set of multi-cultural policies 
which, through government subsidies, subsidised and promoted the 
otherness of migrants for several decades. Other countries also embraced 
multiculturalism. In the Netherlands, however, this policy represented a 
continuation of an older tradition of pillarization. Multiculturalism was not 
pillarization in new clothes, however, although there was a continuity of the 
underlying ideas, as this article will show. This led to a great deal of enthusiasm 
for multiculturalism, and subsequently to great disappointment, without it 
ever becoming clear what exactly the aim of the policy was and how its success 
or failure could be measured. The central thesis of this article is that the 
successive development of pillarization and multiculturalism in the Netherlands 
has led to a reinforcement of essentialist ideas concerning migrants and their 
descendants, as well as a freezing of ideas on ‘the’ Dutch culture. This double 
freezing then made adaptation difficult or impossible.
In	general,	people	tend	to	think	of	society	in	simple	categories,	because	
simplification	makes	the	social	world	understandable	and	manageable.	
It	rationalises	existing	social	arrangements,	and	creates	the	illusion	of	
control.1	Categorisations	and	essentialist	beliefs	form	the	basis	for	inclusion	
and	exclusion,	and	make	it	possible	to	hold	groups	responsible	for	their	
(perceived)	members.2	Essentialist	beliefs	about	groups	are	central	to	racism,	
but	are	also	used	for	self-identification	and	can	play	a	role	in	the	process	of	
group	emancipation.3	However,	the	history	of	Dutch	integration	policy	shows	
that	categorisation	not	only	influences	how	people	define	themselves	or	are	
defined	by	others4,	but	also	–	and	more	importantly	–	leads	to	fossilisation	of	
ideas	about	the	culture	of	immigrants,	and	that	of	society	at	large.	Collective	
amnesia	regarding	change	stimulates	this	process	of	fossilisation	or	cultural	
‘freezing’.5	This	explains	the	recent	increase	in	Dutch	intolerance	towards	
	
t
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immigrants	and	their	offspring,	which	has	taken	outside	observers	by	
surprise,	because	the	Netherlands	has	for	centuries	been	proud	of	its	record	
of	tolerance	and	hospitality.6	Several	German	politicians	have	expressed	the	
view	that	the	open	Islamophobia	currently	common	in	the	Netherlands	would	
be	impossible	in	Germany.7	The	recent	Dutch	move	towards	intolerance	
can	however	partly	be	explained	by	the	Dutch	history	of	pillarization	(or	
vertically	segmented	pluralism)8	and	the	transfer	of	ideas	from	pillarization	
to	multiculturalism,	in	combination	with	the	top-down,	state-led	interference	
with	immigrant	organising	which	resulted	from	both	of	these	factors.
	 Pillarization	was	a	distinctive	feature	of	Dutch	society,	but	
multicultural	policy	was	not	typically	Dutch,	and	neither	is	the	tendency	to	
talk	about	the	outcomes	of	this	policy	in	terms	of	tragedy9,	or	failure	(often	
without	specifying	what	the	goal	of	the	policy	was	or	how	its	success	or	failure	
can	be	measured).10	Failure	is	then	attributed	either	to	unwillingness	on	the	
part	of	immigrants,	or	to	wrong	policies,	or	both.	It	can	be	shown	that	the	
unintended	cumulative	effect	of	state	interference	with	immigrant	organising	
during	pillarization,	and	later	multiculturalism,	has	led	to	what	I	call	‘cultural	
freezing’:	the	enforcement	of	essentialist	ideas	about	both	the	culture	of	
migrants	and	Dutch	culture.	If	cultures	are	seen	as	static,	integration	or	
adaptation	is	impossible,	and	attempts	at	such	will	inevitably	fail.
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	 I	will	start	with	some	general	remarks	about	immigrant	organising,	
pillarization	and	multiculturalism.	These	will	be	followed	by	sections	
describing	organisation	among	immigrants,	the	influence	of	government	
policy	and	the	effects	of	these	on	ideas	about	Dutch	culture.11	
Immigrant organisations 
The	extent	to	which	immigrants	cluster	in	organisations	is	a	measure	of	
collectively	expressed	and	collectively	ascribed	identity.12	The	character,	
number	and	size	of	such	organisations	indicate	the	degree	to	which	
immigrants	wish	to	profile	themselves	as	different,	or	the	extent	to	which	
others	see	them	as	different.13	It	is	also	through	these	organisations	that	
authorities	address	immigrants	as	a	collective.	As	such,	organisations	say	
something	about	the	demarcations	within	and	between	immigrant	groups,	
and	between	immigrants	and	non-migrants.14	Immigrant	organising	is	
stimulated	by	(perceived)	cultural	differences	between	immigrants	and	non-
immigrants,	migration	patterns	and	motives,	characteristics	of	the	immigrant	
group	(sex	ratio,	religion,	numbers,	concentrations,	age)	and	the	division	of	
resources	among	the	immigrants.15	The	opportunity	structure	of	the	country	
of	settlement	is	crucial	to	immigrant	organising	as	this	can	frustrate,	facilitate	
or	encourage	organisation	among	immigrants.	A	bell-shaped	relationship	
exists	between	government	interference	and	associational	behaviour.16 
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At	one	end	of	the	scale	are	countries	where	the	government	forbids	or	
discourages	immigrant	organisations.	In	the	middle,	we	find	countries	where	
tolerating	and	funding	immigrant	organisations	stimulate	the	creation	and	
continuation	of	such	organisations.	At	the	other	end	of	the	scale	are	those	
countries	where	too	much	government	interference	leads	to	the	crowding	out	
of	immigrants’	own	initiatives.	As	we	shall	see	below,	the	Dutch	government	
has	encouraged,	facilitated	and	subsidised	immigrant	organisations,	but	has	
also	crowded	out	immigrant	initiatives.	Pillarization	within	Dutch	society	and	
the	way	multicultural	policies	have	been	implemented	has	contributed	to	this.	
Pillarization
Pillarization,	which	characterised	Dutch	society	between	1900	and	1960,	
has	been	defined	as	a	form	of	segmental	differentiation	in	a	functionally	
differentiated	society,	which	promotes	social	exclusiveness	and	an	in-group	
mentality.17	When	the	term	was	first	coined,	shortly	after	World	War	II,	it	was	
seen	as	a	typically	Dutch	phenomenon.	Later	authors	pointed	out	that	other	
countries	–	such	as	Belgium,	Switzerland	or	Austria	–	had	similar	systems	
of	segmented	pluralism,	which	were	used	for	social	mobilisation	and	the	
structuring	of	political	conflict	and	compromise.18	In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	
however,	politicians	and	social	scientists	saw	pillarization	as	a	uniquely	Dutch	
(and	promising)	transition	to	modernity.19	
	 In	the	Netherlands,	pillarization	meant	segmentation	of	society	into	
religious	and	secular	blocs	and	subcultures.	There	were	four	pillars	(Catholic,	
Protestant,	Socialist	and	Liberal),	but	only	the	Catholic	and	Protestant	pillars	
provided	the	cradle-to-grave	embeddedness	said	to	characterise	a	pillarized	
society.	The	Catholic	pillar	showed	most	coherence.	The	Protestant	pillar	split	
into	two	or	more	pillars20,	and	the	Socialist	and	Liberal	pillars	were	largely	the	
result	of	strong	organisation	among	Catholics	and	Protestants.21	
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Descriptive Concept of Secularization’, Sociology 
of Religion 60:3 (Autumn 1999) 229-247, 231.
18 Val R. Lorwin, ‘Segmented Pluralism: Ideological 
Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller 
European Democracies’, Comparative Politics 3:2 
(January 1971) 141-175; Frederick C. Engelmann and 
Mildred A. Schwartz, ‘Partisan Stability and the 
Continuity of a Segmented Society: The Austrian 
Case’, The American Journal of Sociology 79:4 
(January 1974) 948-966.
19 Andrew Goss, ‘From Tong-Tong to Tempo 
Doeloe: Eurasian Memory Work and the 
Bracketing of Dutch Colonial History, 1957-1961’, 
Indonesia 70 (October 2000) 9-36, 13.
20 Paul Dekker and Peter Ester, ‘Depillarization, 
Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization: 
Empirical Trends in Dutch Society 1958-1992’, 
Review of Religious Research 37:4 (June 1996) 325-
341.
21 A. Lijphart, Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de 
Nederlandse politiek (Haarlem 1980, 8th print) 74.
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	 Pillarization	as	a	policy	meant	that	groups	could	apply	for	government	
funding	for,	for	instance,	private	schools,	the	building	of	places	of	worship	
and	support	for	their	organisations.	In	the	1950s	(shortly	before	the	onset	of	
depillarization),	more	organisations	than	ever	–	active	in	more	fields	than	
ever	–	received	state	subsidies.22	Immigrant	organising	was	influenced	by	
pillarization	–	as	will	be	described	below	–	although	this	was	no	more	than	a	
footnote	within	the	larger	history	of	pillarization.
Multiculturalism
There	is	an	extensive	literature	on	multiculturalism,	part	of	which	seeks	
to	pass	moral	judgement	(was	multiculturalism	good	or	bad?)	or	deals	
with	the	(alleged)	failure	of	multicultural	policy.23	This	article	takes	a	
different	approach,	and	examines	the	functionality	of	multiculturalism:	
why	was	it	pursued	as	a	policy,	how	did	it	change	over	time,	and	what	were	
its	consequences?24	Some	authors	have	equated	pillarization	with	Dutch	
multiculturalism.25	However,	Catholics	and	Protestants	formed	large	groups	
within	Dutch	society,	while	the	groups	that	were	targeted	by	the	Dutch	
multicultural	policies	consisted	of	small	minorities,	with	a	weak	socio-
economic	position.	Furthermore,	the	people	who	formed	the	pillars	were	
seen	as	members	of	Dutch	society,	whereas	the	groups	that	were	targeted	by	
multiculturalism	were	often	not.26
	 In	the	1960s	and	1970s,	multiculturalism	emerged	as	an	ideology	
and	as	a	policy	for	managing	the	cultural	diversity	that	resulted	from	
increased	immigration	to	Western	countries27,	or	as	a	way	to	avoid	coping	
with	change.28	It	was	not	only	the	Netherlands	that	followed	a	multicultural	
policy;	the	United	Kingdom,	Sweden,	Germany,	Australia,	the	United	States	
22 Christopher G.A. Bryant, ‘Depillarisation in the 
Netherlands’, The British Journal of Sociology 32:1 
(March 1981) 56-74.
23 For a summary of some of the literature 
see: Ayelet Shachar, ‘Two Critiques of 
Multiculturalism’, Cardozo Law Review 23:1 (2001-
2002) 253-297.
24 Leti Volpp, ‘Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, 
Nation, and The Politics of Multiculturalism’, 
Columbia Law Review 96 (1996) 1573-1617, 1588-
1589, 1608-1609.
25 B. Prins, Voorbij de onschuld. Het debat over de 
multiculturele samenleving (Amsterdam 2000) 13.
26 Halleh Ghorashi, Paradoxen van culturele erkenning. 
Management van diversiteit in Nieuw Nederland 
(Amsterdam 2006) 17.
27 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Multiculturalism and its 
Discontents’, Human Rights Law Review 5:1 (2005) 
27-56.
28 Mandy McKerl, ‘Multiculturalism, Gender and 
Violence’, Culture and Religion 8:2 (2007) 187-217, 
204-205.
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and	Canada	did	too.29	Multiculturalism	is	currently	no	longer	seen	as	a	goal,	
but	presented	as	a	reality;	sometimes	with	a	positive	connotation,	but	mostly	
not.30
	 Multiculturalism	as	an	ideology	has	been	defined	as	aspiring	towards	
a	plurality	of	cultures	with	all	members	of	society	seeking	to	live	together,	
while	maintaining	separate	cultures.	According	to	this	view,	all	cultures	
are	of	equal	value,	although	the	recognition	of	the	legitimacy	of	cultures	
other	than	the	dominant	one	usually	pulls	up	short	when	these	clash	with	
perceived	key	values	of	the	dominant	culture.31	According	to	several	critics,	
multiculturalism	may	originally	have	grown	out	of	the	demands	of	minorities	
and	others	for	a	more	inclusive	society,	but	has	become	a	way	to	sidestep	the	
issue	of	racism	or	inequality.	Multiculturalism	ignores	the	fact	that	there	is	no	
mosaic	of	equally	valued	cultures.32	When	multiculturalism	first	took	shape	as	
an	ideology,	it	was	believed	there	might	be.
	 Multiculturalism	allowed	countries	to	seem	tolerant	by	showering	
minorities	with	rights,	while	at	the	same	time	segregating	them.33	
Several	authors	found	that,	while	multiculturalism	had	been	introduced	
as	a	policy	to	facilitate	integration,	in	practice	it	has	done	the	reverse.34	
The	idea	of	multiculturalism	was	appealing	because	acknowledging	
the	rights	of	individuals	and	groups	seemed	to	be	a	way	to	reduce	social	
conflict.	Multiculturalism	granted	groups	the	right	to	make	claims	for	
support as groups.	Facilitation	and	financial	support	from	the	state	were	a	
crucial	part	of	multicultural	policy.35	Multiculturalism	as	a	policy	led	to	
29 H. Runblom, ‘Swedish Multiculturalism in a 
Comparative European Perspective’, Sociological 
Forum 9:4 (1994) 623-640; C. Jopke, ‘State 
Neutrality and Islamic Headscarf Laws in France 
and Germany’, Theory and Society 36:4 (2007) 313-
342.
30 See the Guardian website with the slogan 
‘London. The World in One City’. www.guardian.
co.uk/britain/london/0,,1394802,00.html (21 
March 2010).
31 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, ‘Individualizing 
Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ 
Dilemma’, Columbia Law Review 96:5 (June 1996) 
1093-1167, 1119. 
32 Prema Kurien, ‘Multiculturalism, Immigrant 
Religion, and Diasporic Nationalism: The 
Development of an American Hinduism’, Social 
Problems 51:3 (2004) 362-385, 378. 
33 Robert S. Leiken, ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’, 
Foreign Affairs (July/August 2005) 120-135.
34 Ewald Engelen, ‘Towards an Explanation of 
the Performance Differences of Turks in the 
Netherlands and Germany: The Case for a 
Comparative Political Economy of Integration’, 
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 
97:1 (2006) 69-79, 72; Kurien, ‘Multiculturalism’, 
362-385.
35 Faisal Bhabha, ‘Between Exclusion and 
Assimilation: Experimentalizing Multiculturalism’, 
McGill Law Journal/Revue De Droit De McGill 
54 (2009) 45-90, 57; Patrick Parkinson, ‘Taking 
Multiculturalism Seriously: Marriage Law and the 
Rights of Minorities’, Sydney Law Review 14 (1994) 
473-505; Anne Phillips, ‘When Culture Means 
Gender: Issues of Cultural Defence in the English 
Courts’, The Modern Law Review (2003) 510-531, 
517.
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institutionalisation,	which	dictated	what	was	a	legitimate	identity	and,	as	
such,	how	migrant	communities	defined	and	presented	themselves.36	It	was	
based	on	a	conception	of	groups	as	homogenous,	and	having	unique	and	
inherent	characteristics.37	This	perception	of	a	coherent	and	unified	entity	
was	linked	to	a	belief	in	an	underlying	essence.	Multiculturalism	failed	to	
take	into	account	that	ethnicity	is	not	an	immutable,	primordial	essence,	
but	is	fluid,	amorphous,	and	constantly	being	reinvented.	This	denial	makes	
it	possible	to	search	for	‘authentic’	cultural	differences.	Multiculturalism	
was	morally	and	politically	acceptable	only	if	ethnic	minorities	were	actual	
groups	with	inherent	characteristics.38	It	demanded	the	construction	of	a	
public ethnic	identity	(as	opposed	to	a	private	one),	and	pressed	individuals	
to	organise	into	groups	on	the	basis	of	perceived	cultural	similarity.39 
The	struggle	for	recognition	spurred	ethnic	formation,	organisation	and	
mobilisation	by	ethnic	brokers	who	worked	to	obtain	recognition	by	making	
cultures	visible.	Since	claims	for	recognition	were	based	on	the	supposed	
uniqueness	of	the	group’s	culture,	institutionalisation	of	multiculturalism	
led	to	overemphasising	of	differences	between	groups	and	underplaying	of	
the	diversity	within	groups.	Because	of	this	assumed	group	homogeneity,	
authorities	encouraged	the	formation	of	one	representative	body.	This	
not	only	denied	differences	within	groups,	but	also	increased	competition	
between	them,	as	they	tried	to	legitimise	their	claims	to	speak	on	behalf	of	
‘the	community’,	and	thus	quality	for	funding.	
	 The	institutionalisation	of	multiculturalism	led	to	the	construction	
of	collective	public	identities,	quests	for	authenticity,	assumptions	about	
homogeneity,	and	competition	within	what	are	believed	to	be	communities.	
Institutionalisation	dictated	what	a	legitimate	identity	was	and,	as	such,	
how	migrant	communities	defined	and	presented	themselves.	Crucial	to	
multiculturalism	is	that	integration	was	seen	as	a	group	process,	which	
justified	subsidies	for	immigrant	organisations.40	Immigrants	in	the	
Netherlands	were	encouraged	to	set	up	their	own	organisations.41	As	the	
36 Justus Uitermark, Ugo Rossi and Henk van 
Houtum, ‘Reinventing Multiculturalism: Urban 
Citizenship and the Negotiation of Ethnic 
Diversity in Amsterdam’, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 29:3 (September 
2005) 622-640, 624; J. Salaff and Pearl Chan, 
‘Competing Interests: Toronto’s Chinese 
Immigrant Associations and the Politics of 
Multiculturalism’, Population, Space and Place 13 
(2007) 125-140, 126.
37 Maykel Verkuyten and Peary Brug, 
‘Multiculturalism and Group Status: The Role 
of Ethnic Identification, Group Essentialism 
and Protestant Ethic’, European Journal of Social 
Psychology 34 (2004) 647-661, 647.
38 Verkuyten and Brug, ‘Multiculturalism and Group 
Status’, 648.
39 Kurien, ‘Multiculturalism’, 365.
40 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12: 
Onderzoek Integratiebeleid, Onderzoeksrapport, 
Aanvullend bronnenonderzoek Verwey-Jonker 
Instituut, 79.
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Organisations of migrants could get subsidies if 
activities were presented as ‘cultural’ and ‘authentic’. 
State Mines in Heerlen: performance by dance group 
Pegasus (Pigasos) in the province of Limburg, the Greek 
for Happy Easter in the background, April 1968.
Migrants’ Historical Image Archive, International 
Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.
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sections	below	will	show,	Dutch	government	policy	strongly	influenced	the	
number	of	organisations	that	were	set	up,	as	well	as	their	nature,	goals	and
continuity.	
Stimulating immigrant organisations before 1900
Immigrant	organising	in	the	Netherlands	–	of	course	–	predates	pillarization	
and	multiculturalism.	Whether	and	how	migrants	organised	depended	on	
a	range	of	factors,	which	included	whether	immigrants	could	join	Dutch	
majority	churches	and	other	organisations;	which	tasks	were	delegated	
by	the	local	or	national	governments	to	religious,	majority	or	immigrant	
organisations;	and	whether	religious	organisations	were	held	responsible	for	
their	poorer	brethren.	If	the	civil	government,	guilds	or	majority	churches	
denied	immigrants	access	to	economic,	social	or	political	power,	immigrant	
churches	or	other	immigrant	organisations	could	take	on	particular	functions	
to	make	up	for	these	restrictions.42	
	 Local	and	national	governments	did	play	a	role	in	the	separate	
organisation	of	immigrants.	In	the	sixteenth	century,	for	instance,	refugees	
from	the	Southern	Netherlands	(now	mostly	Belgium)	founded	the	Walloon	
church	in	the	Netherlands,	which	did	not	differ	in	its	religious	practices	from	
the	dominant	Dutch	Calvinist	church	(except	in	the	language	used).	The	
reason	for	stimulating	the	foundation	of	a	separate	church	was	that,	contrary	
to	expectations	within	Dutch	society,	not	all	refugees	proved	to	be	wealthy.	
By	founding	a	separate	church,	the	dominant	Calvinist	church	was	freed	from	
financial	responsibility	for	the	poor	immigrants.	In	the	seventeenth	century,	
Huguenots	fleeing	from	France	also	joined	the	Walloon	church.	Initially,	the	
Huguenots	founded	their	own	churches,	but	the	Walloon	church	deliberately	
stirred	up	trouble	among	the	Huguenots	and	then	appealed	to	the	Dutch	civil	
government	to	exercise	its	power	to	resolve	these	problems	and	make	the	
Huguenots	join	the	Walloon	church.	Lutheran	immigrants	from	Scandinavian	
and	German	countries	also	organised	in	a	separate	church	in	the	Netherlands.	
The	Lutherans	did	not	encounter	restrictions	within	Dutch	society;	they	were	
not	denied	guild	membership	(as	Jewish	and	Catholic	immigrants	sometimes	
were);	they	were	free	to	settle	where	they	liked,	and	to	choose	any	occupation	
they	wanted.	Their	separate	organisation	was	thus	not	intended	to	counter	
exclusion.	The	organisation	of	Lutherans	was	–	like	that	of	Walloons	and	
Huguenots	–	influenced	by	the	civil	authorities.	In	the	Lutheran	church	
41 Proceedings, session 1969-1970, 10504, no. 1: 12 
Foreign Workers Memorandum; Peter Scholten, 
Constructing Immigrant Policies Research-Policy 
Relations and Immigrant Integration in The 
Netherlands (1970-2004) (Arnhem 2007) 78.
42 This section is based on: Penninx and Schrover, 
Bastion of bindmiddel. See this for references.
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This is a portrait of them in Dutch traditional costume, 
Middelburg 1952.
Migrants’ Historical Image Archive, International 
Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.
Migrants from the (former) Dutch East Indies were 
supposed to find their place within pillarized Dutch 
society, but not by starting their own pillar. 
The Ottenhoff family arrived in Middelburg (province 
of Zeeland) from the former Dutch East Indies in 1952. 
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in	the	Netherlands,	sermons	were	in	German,	although	to	many	Lutheran	
immigrants	the	High	German	used	was	as	foreign	as	Dutch.	A	language	issue	
evolved,	fuelled	by	differences	in	orthodoxy.	The	orthodox	and	the	more	
liberal	Lutherans	both	appealed	to	the	Dutch	civil	government.	In	the	end,	the	
liberals	gained	most	support,	but	as	a	result	the	Lutheran	church	symbolically	
broke	with	its	status	as	an	immigrant	church	and	became	a	Dutch	minority	
church,	with	sermons	in	Dutch	and	ministers	who	were	now	trained	in	the	
Netherlands,	and	no	longer	in	German	regions.	Dutch	authorities	also	played	
a	crucial	role	in	the	organisation	of	Jews	in	the	Netherlands.	In	1814,	Jews	–	
immigrants	and	non-immigrants	–	were	forced	into	a	single	organisation	by	
Dutch	civil	authorities,	who	saw	this	as	a	way	to	counter	the	extreme	poverty	
among	some	of	the	Jews:	if	there	was	one	community,	its	richer	members	
could	be	held	responsible	for	the	poorer	ones.	
	 Enforcing	internal	unity	and	creating	external	segregation	via	state-
led,	top-down	initiatives	did	not	originate	at	the	time	of	pillarization	or	
multiculturalism,	but	–	as	we	shall	see	below	–	both	phenomena	did	serve	to	
stimulate	this	further.	
Stimulating immigrant organisations and ethnic othering after 1900
In	the	1920s	and	1930s,	immigrants	made	use	of	the	possibilities	created	by	
pillarization.	One	example	of	this	is	the	German	schools,	set	up	by	migrants	in	
The	Hague,	Amsterdam	and	Venlo,	and	subsided	by	the	Dutch	government.43	
These	subsidies	were,	however,	not	meant	to	create	or	support	ethnic	‘micro-
pillars’.
	 This	changed	after	World	War	II,	but	not	immediately.	Between	1945	
and	1960,	300,000	people	came	to	the	Netherlands	from	the	former	Dutch	
East	Indies	(present-day	Indonesia).	They	formed	the	first	large	group	of	post-
war	immigrants.	The	‘repatriates’	were	carefully	monitored	by	Dutch	social	
workers,	and	a	large	number	of	commissions,	organisations	and	agencies	were	
set	up	to	help	them.	In	1950,	an	umbrella	organisation44	was	established	
which	helped	these	repatriates	from	their	moment	of	arrival.	It	assigned	social	
workers	–	from	the	pillar	that	seemed	most	appropriate	–	to	repatriates.	The	
idea	was	that	the	newcomers	would	find	their	place	within	pillarized	Dutch	
society,	but	not	by	starting	their	own	pillar.45	
43 Katja Happe, Deutsch in den Niederlanden 1918-
1945. Eine historische Untersuchung zu nationalen 
Identifikationsangeboten im Prozess der Konstruktion 
individueller Identitäten (Siegen 2004) 62.
44 Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk en Particulier 
Initiatief voor sociale zorg aan gerepartieerden 
[Central Committee of Religious and Private 
Initiatives for the Social Care for Repatriates]. 
45 Goss, ‘From Tong-Tong to Tempo Doeloe’, 15.
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	 In	the	1960s,	when	guest	workers	started	to	arrive	from	Italy,	Spain	
and	Portugal,	things	did	change.	Guest	worker	immigrants	from	Catholic	
countries	could	have	fitted	into	the	pillarized	structure,	which	at	the	time	of	
their	arrival	was	still	in	place.	Catholic	immigrants	in	the	Netherlands	did	
not	set	up	separate	churches	before	the	1960s.46	Rather	surprisingly,	however,	
the	new	Catholic	immigrants	started	to	do	just	that.	The	reason	for	this	was	a	
fundamental	change	in	ideas	about	church	organisation	within	the	Catholic	
church.47
	 Traditionally,	the	Vatican	forbade	the	formation	of	separate	churches	
based	on	language	or	ethnicity.	In	the	United	States,	Catholic	clergy	showed	
some	leniency	towards	separate	Catholic	churches,	and	German,	Irish,	
Polish,	and	Italian	Catholic	immigrants	there	did	set	up	their	own	churches	
in	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries.48	Around	1900,	Catholic	Poles	
in	the	German	Ruhr	area	and	Irish	migrants	in	the	United	Kingdom	also	
organised	into	separate	churches.49	The	Dutch	clergy	was	stricter,	however:	
in	the	1930s,	Italian,	Slovenian	and	Polish	miners	and	German	dockworkers	
in	the	Netherlands	were	provided	with	chaplains	who	said	mass	and	heard	
confessions	in	their	own	languages,	but	they	were	not	allowed	to	form	
separate	churches.
	 In	1969,	as	an	outcome	of	the	Second	Vatican	Council	(1962-1965),	
the	Catholic	church	broke	with	one	of	its	oldest	principles.	It	dropped	the	
principle	of	territoriality,	which	had	organised	churchgoers	into	parishes,	and 
allowed	migrants	to	start	minority	language	churches.	Shortly	afterwards,	
Spanish,	Italian	and	Portuguese-language	churches	were	set	up	in	the	
Netherlands.50	Immigrants	were	organised	by	language	and	not	according	
to	country	of	origin.	The	Portuguese	speaking	churches,	for	example,	
included	migrants	from	Portugal,	the	Cape	Verde	Islands,	Brazil,	Angola	and	
Mozambique.	
46 W. Sahner, Katholische und Evangelische Seelsorge 
des Deutschtums in Holland. Kirchliche und 
kulturelle Gliederung (Emsdetten 1950); Schrover, 
“Whenever a Dozen Germans meet…” , 847-
864; M. Schrover, ‘Grenzen van het Deutschtum. 
Duitse immigranten in het negentiende-eeuwse 
Nederland’, in: L. Lucassen (ed.), Amsterdammer 
worden. Migranten, hun organisaties en inburgering, 
1600-2000 (Amsterdam 2004) 127-145, 127-128.
47 C. Laarman, ‘De kerk. Migrantengroepen, 
geloofsbeleving en de versplintering van de 
katholieke kerk’, in: I. Hoving, H. Dibbits and M. 
Schrover (eds.), Veranderingen van het alledaagse 
1950-2000 (The Hague 2005) 331-352; Charlotte 
Laarman, ‘De Portugeestalige migranten en hun 
parochies in de Nederlandse katholieke kerk, 
1969-2005’, Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische 
geschiedenis 1 (2007) 117-142.
48 J. Dolan, The Immigrant Church, New York’s Irish 
and German Catholics, 1815-1865 (Baltimore 1975); 
P. D’Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational 
Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism 
(Chapel Hill 2004).
49 L. Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration 
of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe Since 
1850 (Urbana 2005).
50 Laarman, ‘De Portugeestalige migranten’.
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	 The	reason	for	this	dramatic	change	was	that	the	Catholic	church	
feared	that	migrants	might	otherwise	lose	their	faith.	This	fear	was	not	
new,	however,	and	had	not	previously	constituted	grounds	to	change	policy	
(despite	pressure	in	the	United	States).	The	reason	for	the	change	now	was	
that	the	Vatican	–	like	many	of	the	governments	in	the	countries	of	origin	
of	the	guest	workers	–	believed	this	migration	to	be	temporary,	and	that	
organisation	into	separate	migrant	churches	would	facilitate	an	easy	return.	
	 The	change	within	the	Catholic	church	had	a	spin-off	effect	via	a	rather	
complicated	route.	In	the	1960s,	the	Dutch	government	held	employers	
responsible	for	the	well-being	of	the	guest	workers	they	recruited.	The	
employers	delegated	this	responsibility	to	Catholic	charities,	as	these	already	
had	ties	with	the	(Catholic)	guest	workers.	The	charities	then	branched	out	
their	activities	to	non-Catholic	guest	workers	from,	for	instance,	Morocco	and	
Turkey.51	The	employers	initially	funded	the	charities,	but	in	the	1970s	the	
Dutch	government	decided	to	centralise	activities	for	efficiency	reasons.52	The	
Foundations	for	the	Welfare	of	Foreign	Workers	(Stichtingen53)	played	a	crucial	
role.	They	were	subsidised	by	the	Dutch	government	to	the	tune	of	40	percent,	
with	local	authorities	and	employers	covering	the	rest. By	1975,	government	
subsidies	had	increased	to	100	percent,	leading	to	a	corresponding	increase	
in	government	influence	on	and	dependency	by	the	organisations.54	The	
creation	of	the	Foundations	was	a	reason	for	the	general	(non-immigrant)	
organisations	to	no	longer	see	immigrants	as	their	target	group,	and	the	
migrants’	problems	as	no	longer	their	business.55
	 The	Foundations	worked	on	behalf	of	the	guest	workers,	but	were	
not	guest	worker	organisations.	The	Dutch	government	favoured	this	
construction	as	it	feared	influence	both	from	the	countries	of	origin	of	the	
guest	workers	and	from	right-wing	immigrant	organisations	active	in	the	
Netherlands,	such	as	the	Turkish	Grey	Wolves,	in	the	wakes	of	several	severe	
clashes	between	right	and	left-wing	guest	workers	in	the	1960s.56	
51 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
244.
52 Marlou Schrover, Judith ten Broeke and Ronald 
Rommes, Migranten bij de Demka-staalfabrieken in 
Utrecht (1915-1983) (Utrecht 2008).
53 Landelijke Stichting Bijstand Buitenlandse 
Werknemers which unites Stichtingen 
Bijstand Buitenlandse Werknemers and other 
Welzijnsstichtingen.
54 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
127-128, 244.
55 R. Rijkschroeff, J.W Duyvendak and T. Pels, 
Bronnenonderzoek Verwey-Jonker Instituut. 
Tijdelijke Commissie Onderzoek Integratiebeleid 
(Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 11 
(The Hague 2004) 26).
56 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
138-139.
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Government interference in immigrant organisations 
had a crowding-out effect. The bottom-up initiatives by 
guest workers themselves had to compete with top-
down initiatives subsidised and initiated by the Dutch 
government. 
Parents wait for their children outside a Greek 
concentration school, Utrecht 1985.
Migrants’ Historical Image Archive, International 
Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.
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Crowding out
Government	interference	in	immigrant	organisations	had	a	crowding-out	
effect.	The	bottom-up	initiatives	by	guest	workers	themselves	had	to	compete	
with	top-down	initiatives	from	organisations	subsidised	and	initiated	by	
the	Dutch	government.	The	result	was	that,	for	instance,	language	classes	in	
Italian	set	up	by	the	guest	workers	themselves	outside	school	hours,	were	now	
moved	into	schools	and	given	during	school	hours.	The	Italian	guest	workers	
and	their	organisations	protested	against	this,	as	they	feared	their	children	
might	fall	behind	if	they	missed	part	of	the	regular	Dutch	curriculum.	After	
three	years	of	protests,	the	classes	were	again	moved	out	of	the	schools.	The	
Italians	were	however	the	only	group	to	succeed	in	doing	this.	Children	from	
other	countries	were	concentrated	in	certain	schools	(called	concentration	
schools);	one	school	organised	language	lessons	for	all	Spanish	children,	one	
for	all	Turkish	children,	etcetera.	Mother-tongue	apprehension	was	initially	
believed	to	make	it	easier	for	guest	workers	to	return,	but	when	it	became	
clear	many	would	not,	it	was	believed	that	the	classes	would	support	identity	
development	amongst	minorities	and	that	this	would	contribute	to	the	
creation	of	a	multicultural	society.57	
	 In	1974,	immigrant	organisations	were	seen	as	essential	not	only	for	
maintaining	ethnic	identity,	but	also	for	smoothing	relations	with	Dutch	
society.58	In	1975,	the	minister	of	Social	Work	pressed	for	more	representation	
of	guest	workers	within	the	Foundations.	This	was	surprising,	as	only	one	
year	previously,	the	authorities	were	of	the	opinion	that	guest	workers	did	
not	qualify	for	managerial	positions	within	the	Foundations	because	of	their	
social	and	cultural	background.	The	Foundations	did	not	manage	to	find	
candidates,	however,	and	nothing	changed.59	
	 Between	1973	and	1981,	guest	workers	protested	against	their	lack	
of	influence.	In	several	Dutch	towns,	there	were	groups	of	volunteers	(many	
of	them	left-wing	students)	who	gave	Dutch	language	lessons	to	guest	
workers,	and	helped	them	with	housing	and	labour	issues.	The	left-wing	
Dutch	students	and	other	Dutch	volunteers	played	a	crucial	role	in	setting	up	
left-wing	guest	worker	organisations,	especially	for	Turkish	and	Moroccan	
workers.	In	due	course,	these	organisations	stood	up	against	the	Dutch	
influence,	which	they	called	patronising	and	colonial.60	The	students	and	
other	non-immigrant	volunteers	joined	protests	by	the	guest	workers	against	
57 Scholten, Constructing Immigrant Policies Research, 
81-82.
58 Rijkschroeff, Duyvendak and Pels, 
Bronnenonderzoek integratiebeleid, 24.
59 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
127-128, 138.
60 Ibidem, 140, 142, 253.
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the	Foundations	and	set	up	alternative	immigrant	Councils	(Raden)61,	which	
called	the	Foundations	old-fashioned	and	patronising.	The	Councils	were,	
like	the	Foundations,	fully	subsidised	by	national	and	local	governments.62	
These	Councils	were	also	not	immigrant	organisations,	as	was	true	for	the	
Foundations.	Unlike	the	Foundations,	the	Councils	however	did	include	
representatives	of	migrant	groups,	but	never	as	part	of	the	management.	
	 The	Foundations	and	the	Councils	competed	with	each	other	for	the	
right	to	represent	guest	workers.	They	also	competed	for	subsidies.63	The	
Councils	favoured	left-wing	initiatives	and	successfully	protested	against	
subsidies	for	religious	organisations	set	up	by	the	guest	workers.	This	refusal	
created	an	opening	for	interference	by	the	countries	of	origin,	which	then	sent	
money	and	imams.64	The	result	of	all	this	was	a	remarkable	constellation.	The	
Foundations	and	the	Councils	received	subsidies	from	the	Dutch	government	
and	competed	with	each	other	and	with	left-wing	immigrant	organisations.	
Right-wing	and	religious	immigrants’	organisations	were	subsidised	by	the	
countries	of	origin	and	thereby	evaded	interference	and	crowding	out	by	
Dutch	organisations.65	The	right	was	united,	the	left	was	divided.66	In	1975,	
elections	were	organised	for	the	Council	in	the	Dutch	town	Utrecht.	Because	
right-wing	guest	workers	were	so	much	better	organised	than	their	left-wing	
compatriots,	all	guest	worker	representatives	in	the	Councils	following	the	
elections	were	right-wing.67	A	clash	with	the	left-wing	Dutch	volunteers	
followed,	and	this	signalled	the	end	of	the	Councils.
Institutional path dependency
In	the	1970s,	the	way	in	which	group	activities	were	subsidised	made	
it	advantageous	to	belong	to	an	ethnic	group.	It	was	believed	that	by	
maintaining	group-specific	facilities,	the	socio-cultural	emancipation	of	
groups	could	be	furthered,	which	would	benefit	individual	socio-economic	
participation.	This	idea	echoes	the	ideas	behind	pillarization.	Subsidies	were	
61 Belangenraad Buitenlandse Werknemers or 
Migrantenraad; 1973 in Utrecht, 1974 in Dordrecht, 
1976 in Gouda, and in 1978 in Delft.
62 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
138, 142.
63 W. Tinnemans, Een gouden armband. Een 
geschiedenis van mediterrane immigranten in 
Nederland, 1945-1994 (Utrecht 1994) 238.
64 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
247.
65 Nicolaas Landman, Van mat tot minaret. De 
institutionalisering van de Islam in Nederland 
(Amsterdam 1992); T. Sunier, ‘Moslims in de 
Nederlandse politieke arena’, in: T. Sunier et 
al. (eds.) Emancipatie en subcultuur. Sociale 
bewegingen in België en Nederland (Amsterdam 
2000) 138-157; Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 
28689, no. 12, 139, 141.
66 Penninx and Schrover, Bastion of bindmiddel.
67 Tinneman, Een gouden armband, 137; I. van der 
Valk, Van migratie naar burgerschap. Twintig jaar 
Komitee Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland 
(Amsterdam 1996).
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not	granted	to	organisations	that	cut	across	ethnic	boundaries.	Immigrants	
were	forced	into	homeland-based	organisations,	whose	leaders	were	
incorporated	into	advisory	bodies	and	procedures.	State	funding	relieved	these	
organisations	from	mobilising	a	constituency.68	Activities	had	to	be	presented	
as	‘cultural’	and	‘authentic’.	Local	and	national	governments	used	the	subsidies	
to	the	organisations	to	keep	in	touch	with	communities,	and	in	this	way	held	
communities	responsible	for	the	actions	of	individuals.69	This	mirrors	ideas	
about	segregation	and	immigrant	organisation	from	before	1900.
	 The	policy	of	the	1970s	can	be	described	as	‘selective	exemptionism’.	
Immigrants	were	encouraged	to	retain	what	was	believed	to	be	their	‘original’	
culture,	through	subsidies	and	exemptions	from	general	rules.	The	same	
leeway	was	however	not	granted	to	non-migrants	wishing	to	retain	their	
culture.	In	1974,	for	instance,	Dutch	women	from	the	province	Zeeland	
protested	–	without	success	–	against	the	obligation	to	wear	a	helmet	when	
riding	a	moped,	as	this	made	it	impossible	for	them	to	wear	their	traditional	
caps	with	large	wings	and	golden	ornaments,	which	were	part	of	their	
traditional	dress.70
	 In	1981,	the	government	decided	that	migrants	should	use	general	
organisations	whenever	possible,	rather	than	receive	subsidies	for	their	own	
organisations.	Subsidies	were	reduced	and	the	organisations	which	still	
received	subsidies	had	to	adapt	their	goals:	there	was	no	more	bonding,	but	
only	bridging.71	National	umbrella	organisations	continued	to	be	subsidised,	
but	had	few	ties	with	local	immigrant	organisations	and	did	not	represent	
large	numbers	of	migrants.	Not	all	migrants	were	seen	as	in	need	of	this	
kind	of	representation.	Migrants	from	some	countries	–	principally	Turkey	
and	Morocco	–	were	seen	as	more	problematic	and	more	in	need	of	support	
than	others.72	Municipal	councils	tried	to	get	‘the	Moroccans’	or	‘the	Turks’	
to	participate	in	and,	perhaps	more	importantly,	to	sanction	local	policies,	
but	without	involving	mosques,	right-wing	organisations	or	organisations	
financed	by	countries	of	origin.	Municipal	councils	started	a	policy	of	
‘artificial	fertilisation’:	social	workers,	paid	by	the	municipalities,	set	up	
self-help	organisations.	Mosques	were	kept	at	a	distance,	because	municipal	
councils	felt	the	state	should	not	interfere	in	religious	matters.	By	this	time,	
the	process	of	secularisation	and	depillarization	was	in	full	swing.	Religious	
migrant	organisations,	and	especially	the	mosques,	were	largely	ignored,	
avoided	and	opposed.	As	a	result,	these	developed	in	isolation	from	the	rest	
68 Thom Duyvené de Wit and Ruud Koopmans, 
‘The Integration of Ethnic Minorities into Political 
Culture: The Netherlands, Germany and Great 
Britain Compared’, Acta Politica 40 (2005) 50-73. 
69 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
251.
70 www.nuentoen.nl/fotos/118101/verplichting-
valhem-middelburg-protest-.html (21 March 
2010).
71 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
137, 248.
72 Ibidem, 130, 134, 253.
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Selective exemptionism in the 1970s. Migrants were 
granted certain rights, based on what was claimed to 
be their cultural heritage, while similar rights were not 
granted to Dutch non-migrants, who tried to make 
claims on exemptions based on tradition. The picture 
shows an unsuccessful protest in 1974 against the 
wearing of safety helmets on mopeds by Dutch women 
who wear national dress with matching caps.
Cor Out, Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau anp.
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of	Dutch	society.	Local	and	national	governments	concentrated	money	and	
manpower	on	the	development	of	non-religious	self-help	organisations.	
Despite	–	or	perhaps	because	of	–	all	the	subsidies	and	professional	support,	
these	organisations	mostly	failed.73	
	 At	the	end	of	the	1980s,	multicultural	policy	changed	again.	The	
cultural	brokers	lost	influence,	and	the	immigrant	organisations	gained	
some.74	In	1983,	the	government	recognised	that	many	of	the	guest	workers	
and	their	families	would	stay	in	the	Netherlands	permanently.75	The	adagio	
‘integration	while	retaining	identity’	was	dropped	from	government	policy,	
although	political	parties	continued	to	use	it	for	decades	afterwards.76	The	
same	went	for	institutions,	the	media	and	the	public	debate.	Almost	25	years	
after	the	idea	was	abandoned,	institutional	path	dependency	meant	this	
idea	continued	to	resonate	in	public	debates.77	Moroccans,	for	instance,	are	
currently	presented	as	less	integrated	than	Turks	because	they	organise	less	
as	Moroccans	and	fail	to	stand	up	for	‘the	Moroccan	community’.78	This	is	a	
point	of	view	that	reflects	the	initial	ideas	behind	multiculturalism.
The invention of ethnic minorities
The	Dutch	government	stated	in	a	1983	policy	memorandum	that	the	
Netherlands	had	a	multicultural	character,	but	that	migrants	had	to	respect	
and	honour	the	norms	and	values	of	Dutch	society.79	Immigrants	were	now	
labelled	‘ethnic	minorities’.80	What	an	ethnic	minority	was,	was	not	defined	
in	the	memorandum,	because	the	politicians	who	drafted	it	could	not	agree	
on	a	definition.81	They	simply	listed	the	groups	of	migrants	that	the	policy	
targeted.	Not	all	groups	were	included,	since	not	all	groups	were	seen	as	
problematic.	Turks	and	Moroccans	were,	but	Chinese,	for	instance,	were	not.	
73 H. van Ooijen, ‘Religion and Emancipation: A 
Study of the Development of Moroccan Islamic 
Organizations in a Dutch Town’, in: W.A.R. 
Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (eds.), Islam in 
Dutch Society: Current Developments and Future 
Prospects (Kampen 1992) 163-180, 176-177.
74 Scholten, Constructing Immigrant Policies Research, 
158.
75 Ibidem, 80; Proceedings, session 1982-1983, 16102, 
no. 21, 10.
76 Alfons Fermin, Nederlandse politieke partijen over 
minderhedenbeleid 1977-1995 (Amsterdam 1997) 121.
77 Compare: R. Brubacker, ‘The Return of 
Assimilation?: Changing Perspectives on 
Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany 
and the United States’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 
24 (2001) 531-548; Erik Snel, ‘De vermeende kloof 
tussen culturen. Een sociologisch commentaar op 
een actueel debat’, Sociologische Gids 50:3 (2003) 
236-258.
78 Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum, ‘Reinventing 
Multiculturalism’, 635.
79 Rijkschroeff, Duyvendak and Pels, 
Bronnenonderzoek integratiebeleid, 33.
80 Proceedings, session 1982-1983, 16102, no. 
20-21 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 
‘Minderhedennota’, September 1983.
81 Henk Molleman, ‘De drie I’s: Immigratie – 
Integratie – Islam (5). Het minderhedenbeleid in 
Retrospectief’, Socialisme en Democratie (2003) 
no. 1-2, 62-66.
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	 In	the	1990s,	government	support	for	immigrant	organisations	was	
again	reduced,	but	was	still	not	stopped	altogether,	and	the	infrastructure	
remained	intact.82	To	qualify	for	subsidy,	immigrant	organisations	
reproduced	stereotypical	ideas.	Subsidy	policy	not	only	shaped	the	way	
subsidy	requests	were	phrased,	but	also	the	type	of	activities	organisations	
undertook.83	Organisations	were	more	likely	to	get	subsidies	if	their	plans	
were	based	on	stereotypical	ideas,	especially	with	regard	to	Muslims.	In	this	
way,	the	Dutch	state	subsidised	the	‘othering’	of	migrants.	Subsidies	were	
mostly	short-term	and	project	based,	and	the	ensuing	repeated	reproduction	
of	ideas	enforced	stereotyping.84	The	system	of	subsidy	led	to	fossilisation,	
with	the	same	organisations	receiving	subsidies	for	the	same	activities	year	in,	
year	out.85	
	 In	2000,	the	subsidies	for	national	organisations	were	stopped,	but	
in	2002	a	new	temporary	subsidy	was	introduced.	A	great	deal	of	emphasis	
in	political	discussions	was	placed	on	a	change	in	policy,	but	very	little	
changed	in	practice.86	Opinion	leaders	criticised	multiculturalism,	calling	it	
a	‘multicultural	tragedy’.87	Immigrant	self-organisations	were	no	longer	seen	
as	a	means	to	develop	and	strengthen	identity,	nor	as	a	route	to	emancipation.	
Cultural	difference	was	problematised.88	In	2001,	the	policy	focus	shifted	
from	social-economic	participation	towards	reducing	social	and	cultural	
distance	between	migrants	and	Dutch	society.89	In	2002,	the	murder	of	Dutch	
politician	Pim	Fortuyn	was	presented	as	a	‘clash	of	civilisations’.	Fortuyn	
was	murdered	by	a	Dutch	animal-rights	activist,	who	wanted	him	to	stop	
exploiting	Muslims	as	scapegoats.	Fortuyn	was	presented	as	someone	killed	
for	his	criticism	of	multiculturalism.90	The	same	was	true	of	filmmaker	Theo	
van	Gogh,	murdered	in	2004.
82 Scholten, Constructing Immigrant Policies Research, 
85.
83 Sunier, ‘Moslims in de Nederlandse politieke 
arena’, 138-157; Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 
28689, no. 12, 247, 262; Uitermark, Rossi and Van 
Houtum, ‘Reinventing Multiculturalism’, 627.
84 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
147.
85 Ibidem,  132-134.
86 R. Koopmans, ‘“Zachte heelmeesters”: 
Een vergelijking van de resultaten van het 
Nederlandse en Duitse integratiebeleid en wat de 
wrr daaruit niet concludeert’, Migrantenstudies 
18:2 (2002) 87-92.
87 Paul Scheffer. ‘Het multiculturele drama’, nrc 
Handelsblad 29 January 2000; compare: S. Castles, 
‘The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration 
Policies’, imr 38:3 (Fall 2004) 852-884.
88 Rijkschroeff, Duyvendak and Pels, 
Bronnenonderzoek integratiebeleid, 54.
89 Scholten, Constructing Immigrant Policies Research, 
86.
90 Essed and Nimako, ‘Designs and (Co)Incidents 
Cultures of Scholarship’, 304; Scholten, 
Constructing Immigrant Policies Research, 219.
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A Muslim pillar
Migrants	from	Turkey	and	Morocco	and	their	offspring	increasingly	came	to	
be	referred	to	as	Muslims.91	Dutch	society	rapidly	secularised	in	the	1960s	and	
1970s,	and	all	kinds	of	behaviour	that	had	previously	been	labelled	deviant	–	
homosexuality,	divorce,	children	born	out	of	wedlock	–	came	to	be	accepted.	
Society	moved	from	emancipation	within	pillarization	to	emancipation	
from	pillarization.	Rather	surprisingly,	the	Dutch	government	started	to	
press	for	the	organisation	of	Muslims	into	what	could	be	called	an	Islamic	
pillar,	just	as	pillarization	had	definitely	come	to	an	end.92	Islamic	migrants	
from	various	countries	did	not	come	with	a	unified	social	infrastructure.	
This	infrastructure,	derived	from	and	based	on	ideas	about	pillarization,	
was	wrapped	around	them	when	they	became	part	of	Dutch	society.93	
Islamic	migrants	found	themselves	in	a	confusing	landscape.	Dutch	society	
strongly	emphasised	its	secularised	nature,	but	also	had	a	large	number	
of	Christian	holidays	(which	many	people	do	not	celebrate	in	a	religious	
way),	but	Muslims	are	not	allowed	to	exchange	these	for	Islamic	holidays.94	
Primary	and	secondary	education	are	still	recognisably	organised	according	
to	religion	(although	often	in	name	only).	Islamic	schools	can	be	subsidised,	
but	meet	with	a	lot	of	resistance.	The	subsidy	for	building	places	of	worship	
continued	to	exist	after	the	demise	of	pillarization.95	The	Law	on	Premium	
Church	Construction	was	abolished	in	1975,	but	in	1976	a	Broad	Regulation	
Concerning	the	Subsidising	of	Prayer-Halls	was	introduced,	and	this	was	
followed	in	1981	by	a	Temporary	Regulation	especially	for	Muslims.	Only	in	
1984	and	1986	did	two	motions	in	Parliament	abolish	subsidies	for	prayer	
halls	for	Muslims.	
	 At	various	points	in	time,	the	Dutch	authorities	have	felt	a	need	to	
approach	the	‘Islamic	community’.96	Muslims	came	to	the	Netherlands	
from	Indonesia	(in	small	numbers	only),	Suriname,	Iran,	Iraq,	(former)	
Czechoslovakia,	Afghanistan,	Somalia,	(former)	Yugoslavia,	Turkey	and	
Morocco,	as	well	as	various	other	countries.	There	were	language	differences	
between	these	groups,	and	there	were	also	differences	between	Ahmadiyyas,	
Sunnites	and	Shi’ites.97	Sunnites	form	the	majority	among	Muslims	in	the	
Netherlands.	The	Ahmadiyyas,	who	mostly	came	from	Suriname,	are	not	
recognised	as	Muslims	by	Sunnites,	and	sometimes	also	not	by	Shi’ites.	
91 Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, no. 12, 
256.
92 Ghorashi, Paradoxen van culturele erkenning, 11.
93 S. Blok, Bruggen bouwen (The Hague 2004); 
Proceedings, session 2003-2004, 28689, nos. 8-9, 
79-80.
94 W.A. Shadid, ‘The Integration of Muslim 
Minorities in the Netherlands’, imr 25:2 (Summer 
1991) 355-374.
95 Blok, Bruggen bouwen, 487.
96 Landman, Van mat tot minaret, 32; Yvonne 
Yazbeck Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From 
Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford 2002).
97 Maulana G.R. Alladien Al-Qadiri, Ahmadia’s 
zijn geen moslims. Verzamelde krantenartikelen 
(Amsterdam 2000) 1-2.
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The first mosque in Amsterdam. Turks in Amsterdam 
often used the Nieuwzijds Chapel on the Rokin as 
a prayer space. There was a need for a large space, 
particularly during Ramadan and Friday prayers. The 
chapel eventually passed into in Turkish ownership 
in 1977 and a mosque was established. Until 1984, the 
building of mosques could be subsidised.
Migrants’ Historical Image Archive, International 
Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.
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	 There	have	been	no	bottom-up	initiatives	to	unite	Muslims	in	the	
Netherlands.	Rather,	it	has	been	the	Dutch	government	which	has	made	
repeated	attempts	to	achieve	this.	The	first	umbrella	organisation	for	Muslims	
was	set	up	in	1975,	but	it	excluded	the	Ahmadiyyas.98	It	was	discontinued	
in	1980.	In	1981,	a	new	organisation	was	formed,	which	managed	to	survive	
until	1983.99	There	were	also	various	parallel	organisations	which	claimed	
to	represent	all	Muslims	in	the	Netherlands,	but	in	fact	none	of	them	did.100	
In	1989,	after	the	Satanic	Verses	controversy	(and	protest	by	Muslims	in	the	
Netherlands	against	the	book	by	the	British-Indian	novelist	Salman	Rushdie),	
the	government	felt	a	more	urgent	need	to	get	in	touch	with	the	‘Islamic	
community’.101	Umbrella	organisations	came	and	went,	but	none	of	these	
managed	to	survive	for	more	than	a	few	years.	After	the	El	Moumni	affair	
(a	Rotterdam	Imam	who	in	2001	declared	that	homosexuality	is	a	disease),	
the	9/11	attacks	(2001)	and	the	murder	of	Theo	van	Gogh	(2004),	the	Dutch	
government	increased	its	attempts	to	create	an	Islamic	umbrella	organisation.	
In	2004,	the	Contact	Body	Muslims	and	Government	(cmo)102	was	established,	
which	represented	Sunnites	only.	The	government	twice	officially	investigated	
to	what	extent	the	body	represented	all	Muslims.	Despite	the	fact	that	it	
was	found	that	it	did	not,	it	was	recognised	as	the	official	interlocutor	of	the	
Dutch	government.	The	Dutch	government	wants	to	talk	to	one	organisation	
only,	which	represents	all	Muslims	in	the	Netherlands.	It	is	aware	of	the	fact	
that	the	cmo	does	not	do	so,	but	still	seeks	out	this	organisation	to	approve	
government	policy,	or	to	publicly	disapprove	of	incidents.	The	government	
seeks	to	hold	the	‘Muslim	community’	responsible,	as	immigrant	churches	
were	held	responsible	for	their	members	in	the	Early	Modern	Period.	
Freezing Dutch culture
On	the	whole,	we	have	seen	that	the	heritage	of	pillarization	and	the	way	
in	which	multicultural	policies	were	implemented	in	the	Netherlands	led	
to	static	ideas	about	‘immigrant	cultures’.	These	ideas	were	matched	by	
static	ideas	about	‘Dutch	culture’.	When,	in	the	autumn	of	2007,	Princes	
Maxima	claimed	that	there	was	no	such	thing	as	the	Dutch	identity,	this	led	
98 Federatie van moslimorganisaties in Nederland: 
fomon.
99 Stichting Federatie Moslim Organisaties in 
Nederland: mon.
100 W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, 
Moslims in Nederland. Minderheden en religie in 
een multiculturele samenleving (second edition; 
Houten 1997) 75; Landman, Van mat tot minaret, 
249-250.
101 Shadid and Van Koningsveld, Moslims in 
Nederland, 75-76; Landman, Van mat tot minaret, 
251-253; Thijl Sunier, Islam in beweging. Turkse 
jongeren en islamitische organisaties (Amsterdam 
1996) 76.
102 Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid: cmo.
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to	a	large-scale	debate.	A	Dutch	newspaper	invited	its	readers	to	define	what	
Dutch	culture	was.103	There	was	little	consensus	in	the	result.	Serving	one	
biscuit	only	with	coffee	was	seen	as	typically	Dutch	by	some,	but	as	typically	
Protestant	Dutch	(and	not	Catholic)	by	others.	A	similar	attempt	three	years	
earlier	led	to	similar	discord.104	Answers	differed	according	to	religious	and	
regional	background,	gender	and	age.	From	the	perspective	of	the	United	
States	and	Canada,	the	Dutch	may	live	in	a	country	the	size	of	a	postage	
stamp105,	but	that	does	not	stop	them	from	pointing	out	differences	between	
the	Protestant	North	and	the	Catholic	South,	or	the	urbanised	West	and	the	
rural	rest.	Many	things	that	are	labelled	‘Dutch’	in	public	discussion	are	no	
more	than	a	century	old.	Sinterklaas	(a	holiday	on	December	5th)	has	only	been	
celebrated	in	its	current	form	for	the	last	half	century.	In	the	beginning	of	
the	twentieth	century,	many	Protestants	objected	to	celebrating	this	clearly	
Catholic	saint’s	day.	Bicycles	are	seen	as	typically	Dutch,	but	they	date	from	
around	1890;	Koninginnedag	(Queens	Day:	now	April	30th)	was	introduced	in	
1898,	and	the	national	anthem	in	1932.	In	the	nineteenth	century,	different	
measures	were	used	in	different	regions	of	the	Netherlands;	the	time	on	the	
clock	and	the	date	on	the	calendar	differed	per	region,	and	people	from	the	
North	could	not	understand	people	from	the	South.106
	 The	outcome	of	the	search	for	a	Dutch	identity	is	influenced	by	the	
times	in	which	the	searchers	live.107	During	the	Dutch	Revolt	against	Spain	
(1568-1589)	and	the	Eighty	Years	War	for	Dutch	independence	that	followed,	
frequent	reference	was	made	to	the	Dutch	origin	myth	of	the	Batavian	
uprising	against	the	Roman	Empire	(69-70).108	Later,	the	Dutch	Revolt	
itself	became	a	defining	element	of	Dutch	identity,	although	Catholics	had	
problems	with	its	Protestant	connotation.109	In	the	middle	of	the	nineteenth	
century,	tribes	which	were	believed	to	have	lived	in	the	Netherlands	in	Roman	
times	–	Franks	(in	the	South),	Frisians	(in	the	North)	and	Saxons	(in	the	
103 www.trouw.nl/hetnieuws/nederland/
article812339.ece/Oproep_benoem_de_
Nederlandse_identiteit?pageNumber=7#readers_
responses (10 February 2010). 
104 Trouw 31 March 2004.
105 Peter H. Stephenson, ‘Going to McDonald’s in 
Leiden: Reflections on the Concept of Self and 
Society in the Netherlands’, Ethos 17:2 (1989) 226-
247.
106 Hans Knippenberg and Ben de Pater, De 
Eenwording van Nederland. Schaalvergroting en 
integratie sinds 1800 (Nijmegen 1988) 204; Willem 
Frijhoff, ‘Cultuur op termijn. Een verkenning 
van identiteit in de tijd’, in: Carolien Bouw and 
Bernard Kruithof (eds.), De kern van het verschil. 
Culturen en iden titeiten (Amsterdam 1993) 17-40.
107 Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking 
Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York 1995) 1-2.
108 Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An 
Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age 
(New York 1987) 72.
109 Maria Grever, ‘De natiestaat als pedagogische 
onderneming’, in: Maria Grever and Kees 
Ribbens, Nationale identiteit en meervoudig 
verleden (Amsterdam 2007) 35-60.
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East)	–	became	the	Dutch	mythical	ancestors.110	This	idea	became	popular	at	
the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	because	it	fitted	the	pillarized	society	that	
was	taking	shape.	After	this	founding	myth	had	been	incorporated	into	Nazi	
ideology,	its	appeal	crumbled.	After	World	War	II,	the	Batavian	myth	–	about	
fierce	warriors	who	fought	for	freedom	–	made	its	reappearance.	In	the	1980s	
and	1990s,	the	Polder	model	–	a	Dutch	version	of	consensus	policy	–	became	
fashionable.	This	was	seen	as	a	tendency	towards	pragmatic	cooperation,	in	
spite	of	differences.	Dutch	people	were	believed	to	have	cooperated	since	the	
Middle	Ages,	because	the	Netherlands	is	partly	below	sea	level	and	authorities	
had	to	set	aside	differences	in	order	to	protect	the	land	from	flooding.	
Recently,	the	Polder	mentality	as	key	element	of	Dutch	identity	has	also	been	
debunked	as	a	myth.111	
	 Although	authors	have	pointed	out	since	the	1970s	the	fluidity	of	
collective	identity	construction112,	and	hence	the	pointlessness	of	seeking	
to	find	such113,	this	has	not	stopped	people	from	trying	to	do	so,	and	from	
coming	up	with	answers	that	differ.114	This	is	not	to	deny	that	there	are	trends	
in	Dutch	society,	albeit	temporal,	and	the	attempt	in	this	article	to	identify	
one	of	these	is	testimony	to	this.	Trends,	however,	are	more	ephemeral	than	
discussions	on	Dutch	culture	suggest.	The	search	for	a	collective	identity	is	
neither	new	nor	typically	Dutch,	and	neither	is	the	recent	increase	in	attempts	
to	define	Dutch	identity.	In	November	2009,	Eric	Besson,	the	French	minister	
of	immigration,	national	identity,	integration	and	co-development,	launched	
a	nationwide	debate	on	French	national	identity,	which	led	to	little.	Earlier,	
Prime	Minister	Gordon	Brown	launched	a	road	show	to	promote	the	concept	
of	Britishness,	which	was	later	labelled	an	expensive	flop.115	In	both	cases,	the	
triggers	for	the	debates	were	discussions	about	multicultural	policy,	and	its	
failure.
110 Marnix Beyen, ‘A Tribal Trinity: The Rise and Fall 
of the Franks, the Frisians and the Saxons in the 
Historical Consciousness of the Netherlands since 
1850’, European History Quarterly 30:4 (2000) 493-
532.
111 D. Bos, M. Ebben and H. te Velde, Harmonie 
in Holland? Het poldermodel van 1500 tot nu 
(Amsterdam 2007).
112 F. Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The 
Social Organisation of Cultural Difference (Boston 
1969).
113 R. van Ginkel, Op zoek naar eigenheid. Denkbeelden 
en discussies over cultuur en eigenheid in Nederland 
(The Hague 1999).
114 WRR, Identificatie met Nederland (The Hague, 
Amsterdam 2007).
115 The Times 26 December 2009.
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Conclusion
In	the	recent	Dutch	move	towards	intolerance,	multicultural	policy	is	seen	
as	a	cause	of	problems,	and	multicultural	society	as	its	negative	result.	
Multicultural	society,	however,	is	largely	a	myth.	The	number	of	immigrants	
plus	their	offspring	is	too	small,	and	their	socio-economic	and	cultural	power	
too	restricted,	to	make	more	than	a	small	dent	in	Dutch	culture.	In	general,	
societies	change	because	people	travel,	watch	tv	and	surf	the	internet,	because	
technologies	change	and	the	world	modernises	–	to	name	just	some	of	the	
most	important	causes	for	change.	Words,	foods	or	ways	of	dress	maybe	copied	
from	immigrants,	but	they	are	quickly	‘whitewashed’	and	their	ethnic	origin	
denied	or	(conveniently)	forgotten.116	
	 Dutch	multicultural	policy	was	politically	and	morally	acceptable	
because	of	the	longer	history	of	pillarization	and	government	inference	with	
immigrant	organising.	The	reason	for	the	move	towards	intolerance	is	found	
in	essentialist	assumptions	underlying	multicultural	policy,	which	for	decades	
constructed	migrants	or	minorities	as	different.	This	builds	on	decades	
of	‘othering’	via	government	subsidies.	Multicultural	policy	in	the	long	
run	influenced	thinking	about	Dutch	culture	and	has	led	to	debates	about	
Dutchness,	which	may	have	been	futile,	but	did	have	tangible	consequences,	
most	importantly	on	integration	policy.	Some	aspects	of	this	process	of	
categorisation	are	not	unique	to	the	Dutch	situation.	What	is	unique	to	
the	Dutch	case	is	that,	owing	to	the	cumulative	effect	of	pillarization	and	
multicultural	policy,	the	idea	of	multiculturalism	was	embraced	more	
enthusiastically	than	elsewhere,	and	as	a	result	disappointment	and	bitterness	
were	felt	more	deeply.		q	
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The contributions in this issue discuss the question of the relevance of Dutch 
history to an international public. The authors wish to avoid ‘exceptionalism’, 
but point – with the exception of the piece that examines the Holocaust – 
specifically to the particular in the Dutch past, focusing thereby on evergreen 
themes such as the Golden Age, the Dutch colonial empire and the role of 
religion. A great deal of attention is hereby devoted to the long perspective 
and the peculiar nature of Dutch ‘civil society’. The aim is not so much to 
focus on what is unique to the Netherlands – and certainly not to hold up the 
Netherlands as an example – but rather to attempt to explain the Netherlands 
on the basis of general issues drawn from historiographical debates. In this 
sense, the yardstick applied is the international world. Another striking 
feature of the contributions is that an analysis that takes a longer view – path 
dependency, ‘cultural freezing’ (Schrover) and traditions – is back with a 
vengeance.
What	is	the	international	–	or	even	global	–	relevance	of	Dutch	history?	Why	
should	people	who	are	not	particularly	interested	in	the	details	of	the	history	
of	the	Netherlands	read	about	this	history?	The	contributions	in	this	volume	
offer	a	variety	of	answers	to	these	questions.	They	do	not	pretend	to	give	a	
definitive	set	of	answers,	nor	to	present	just	one	approach,	but	are	rather	
a	set	of	explorations.	A	number	of	things	stand	out,	nevertheless,	and	the	
contributions	have	a	number	of	things	in	common.
	 To	begin	with,	it	could	be	argued	that	posing	these	questions	says	
something	about	the	current	state	of	Dutch	historiography	and	about	the	
role	of	Dutch	history	in	an	international	context.	Dutch	historians	operate	
at	an	international	level,	write	for	an	international	audience	and	participate	
in	international	debates.	This	volume	is	a	reflection	of	this	situation.	The	
authors	do	not	concentrate	on	Dutch	history	as	such,	but	rather	place	their	
national	history	in	an	international	perspective	by	concentrating	on	the	
international	relevance	of	the	history	and	historiography	of	their	country.	
Perhaps	this	also	characterises	the	historiography	of	a	comparatively	small	
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